Proceedings · Session S-565 · filed September 30, 2026
Technology Transfer & IPSession paper
COP31 and the New Colonialism of Technology Transfer
Ahead of COP31, critics call current climate technology transfer a "new colonialism," putting IP ownership, licensing terms and R&D capacity at the center of negotiations.
By Priya Raman3 min read587 words
Summary
- The Climate Watch frames climate technology transfer as a 'new colonialism' ahead of COP31
- The ownership question centers on patents, licensing terms and control of follow-on R&D
- One-way technology export without research-capacity transfer can lock recipients a generation behind

A provocative question is circulating ahead of COP31: who actually owns the climate technologies that the world's decarbonization plans depend on? The Climate Watch has framed the issue bluntly, calling current patterns of technology transfer a "new colonialism" — language that positions intellectual property, licensing terms and manufacturing capacity as the next front in climate geopolitics.
The framing matters for R&D managers because it targets a specific fault line in the climate innovation system. Most low-carbon technologies — from electrolyzers and battery chemistries to carbon capture materials — originate in laboratories and corporate R&D portfolios in high-income countries. When those technologies are "transferred" to developing economies, the terms of transfer determine who captures value, who sets standards, and who controls future iterations of the technology.
The critique embedded in the "new colonialism" label runs along several tracks that portfolio planners should watch.
First, ownership. Patents and proprietary know-how concentrated in a small number of firms and research institutions give the holders pricing power and strategic leverage over deployment timelines. If COP31 negotiations push for compulsory licensing or IP waivers on climate technologies — a demand that has surfaced repeatedly in previous negotiation rounds — vendors holding core patents would face direct pressure on their licensing revenue models.
Second, dependency. Technology transfer arranged as one-way export of finished systems, rather than genuine co-development, can lock recipient economies into supplier relationships without building local R&D capacity. The colonial analogy rests on this structure: raw demand flows one way, refined technological goods and the expertise to improve them flow back at a premium.
Third, control of iteration. Climate technologies are not static artifacts. Improvements to module efficiency, catalyst durability or process integration accrue to whoever runs the ongoing R&D. A transfer agreement that ships hardware without transferring research capability leaves the recipient permanently one generation behind — a gap that compounds with each product cycle.
For laboratory and procurement leaders, the debate translates into concrete questions. Where do licensing terms in collaborative climate projects sit on the spectrum between open access and full proprietary control? Who funds the work — and does the funder's nationality shape where follow-on research and manufacturing land? These are not abstract negotiation postures; they determine whether a given partnership builds or hollows out internal capability.
The Climate Watch's question — "who owns climate solutions?" — also implicates public research institutions. Universities and national laboratories in developed economies hold substantial climate-relevant IP, much of it publicly funded. Whether that IP is licensed on terms that enable broad deployment, or held to maximize returns, is a policy choice that COP31 pressure could force into the open.
The article does not resolve the ownership question, and the positions it surfaces remain contested. Developing-country negotiators have historically argued that climate stability cannot wait for market-rate licensing of technologies needed for mitigation and adaptation. Industrialized-country governments and their firms counter that IP protection is what drives the R&D investment producing those technologies in the first place. Both claims carry weight, and both are testable against evidence on licensing outcomes and innovation rates.
What is clear is the direction of travel. As COP31 approaches, expect technology transfer to move from a boilerplate negotiation chapter to a contested agenda item, with IP architecture, manufacturing localization and research-capacity building as the operative battlegrounds. R&D organizations with climate portfolios would be prudent to stress-test their licensing and collaboration strategies against a scenario in which those terms become subject to multilateral political scrutiny.
via Google News: Technology transfer (Source)
Filed under
- technology-transfer
- intellectual-property
- climate-technology
- cop31
- r-d-strategy
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References
- CIGI Examines Investment Treaties as Tech Transfer Levers in Africa
- China's New Investment Rules Target Strategic Tech Transfer
- EU technology transfer regime: licensing rules face rewrite
- UN Questions Whether New UN Chemicals and Pollution Panel Can Deliver
- Biotech Competition With China Will Be Won in U.S. Labs, Not Tariffs